The non-unique Universe by McCabe, Gordon
The non-unique Universe
Gordon McCabe
January 23, 2010
Abstract
The purpose of this paper is to elucidate, by means of concepts and
theorems drawn from mathematical logic, the conditions under which the
existence of a multiverse is a logical necessity in mathematical physics,
and the implications of Go¨del’s incompleteness theorem for theories of
everything.
Three conclusions are obtained in the final section: (i) the theory of the
structure of our universe might be an undecidable theory, and this con-
stitutes a potential epistemological limit for mathematical physics, but
because such a theory must be complete, there is no ontological barrier to
the existence of a final theory of everything; (ii) in terms of mathematical
logic, there are two different types of multiverse: classes of non-isomorphic
but elementarily equivalent models, and classes of model which are both
non-isomorphic and elementarily inequivalent; (iii) for a hypothetical the-
ory of everything to have only one possible model, and to thereby negate
the possible existence of a multiverse, that theory must be such that it
admits only a finite model.
1 Introduction
In modern mathematical physics and cosmology, a multiverse is defined to be
a collection of possible physical universes.1 Multiverses can be either timeless
collections of disjoint, non-interacting universes, or the result of common phys-
ical processes. The primary examples of the latter are the universe-domains in
Linde’s chaotic inflation theory (1983a and 1983b), and the universes created
inside black holes in Smolin’s theory of cosmological natural selection (2006).
The primary focus of this paper, however, is on timeless multiverses.
The logical existence of such multiverses is a consequence of the fact that
mathematical physics represents the physical world by means of mathematical
1This paper will refrain from using the phrase ‘ensemble of universes’, given that an ensem-
ble is typically considered to be a space which possesses a probability measure. It is debatable
whether the universe collections postulated by mathematical physicists and cosmologists pos-
sess a well-defined probability measure. As Tegmark comments, “Further work on all aspects
of the measure problem is urgently needed. . . as this is necessary for observationally testing
any theory that involves parallel universes at any level, including cosmological inflation and
the string theory landscape,” (2008, VIII, C).
1
structures. These are sets equipped with properties, relationships, operations
and distinguished elements, which are collectively required to satisfy certain
conditions, called the axioms of the structure. To be precise, the axioms define
a species of structure, and each set which possesses that structure is a member of
the species. For example, the vector space axioms define a species of structure,
and each particular vector space is a member of that species.
It is useful at the outset here to introduce some definitions from mathe-
matical logic, including, in particular, the distinction therein between theories
and models. A theory T is defined to be a set of sentences, in some language,
which is closed under logical implication (Enderton, p155). In other words, any
sentence which can be derived from a subset of the sentences in a theory, is
itself a sentence in the theory. A subset of sentences in a theory, from which
the entire theory can be generated by logical implication, is referred to as a set
of axioms for the theory.2 An intepretation of a language provides the language
with its semantics, in the sense that it identifies: the domain over which the
variables in the language range; the elements in the domain which correspond to
the constants in the language; the elements which possess the predicates in the
language; the n-tuples of elements which are related by the n-ary relations in
the language; and the elements which result from performing n-ary operations
upon n-tuples in the domain. A model U of a theory T is an interpretation of
the langauge in which that theory is expressed, which renders each sentence in
the theory as true.
In this precise sense, the axioms which define a mathematical structure are
the axioms of a theory, and each member of a species of structure is a model of
that axiomatic theory.3
If our physical universe is conceived to possess a mathematical structure,
then one can define a multiverse consisting of all the models of that species
of structure. Let us consider a couple of examples. In general relativity, a
universe is represented by a 4-dimensional differential manifold M equipped
with a metric tensor field g and a set of matter fields and gauge force fields {φi}
which generate an energy-stress-momentum tensor T that satisfies the Einstein
field equations
T = 1/(8piG)(Ric− 1/2 R g) .
Ric denotes the Ricci tensor field determined by g, and R denotes the curvature
scalar field. The matter fields have distinctive equations of state, and include
fluids, scalar fields, tensor fields, and spinor fields. Gauge force fields, such
as electromagnetism, are described by n-form fields. Hence, one can define
a general relativistic multiverse to be the class of all models of such n-tuples
{M, g, φ1, ...}, interpreted in this sense.
Alternatively, quantum field theory represents a universe to be a Lorentzian
manifold (M, g) which is equipped with a Hilbert space H , a density oper-
2As defined in Section 4, the subset of sentences must also be decidable.
3In this context, it should be noted that Tegmark (1998, 2008) draws a distinction between
formal systems and mathematical structures, rather than a distinction between theories and
models.
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ator ρ on H , and a collection of operator-valued distributions {φˆi} on M
which take their values as bounded self-adjoint operators onH (Wallace 2001).
A quantum field theory multiverse is the class of all models of such n-tuples
{M, g,H , ρ, φˆ1, ... }, interpreted in this sense.
Such universe collections logically exist by virtue of the absence of contra-
diction in their definition. In the style of Max Tegmark (1998, 2008), one can
then go further, and propose that these universe collections physically exist.
Tegmark first considers the proposal that “some subset of all mathematical
structures. . . is endowed with. . . physical existence,” (1998, p1), but dismisses
this as inadequate because it fails to explain why some particular collection of
mathematical structures is endowed with physical existence rather than another.
This is what philosophers would refer to as a problem of contingency, where a
contingent fact is something which happens to be true, but isn’t true as a matter
of necessity.
Tegmark’s first multiverse paper responded to this problem of contingency by
suggesting that all mathematical structures have physical existence. Tegmark’s
2008 paper, however, incorporated the implications of Go¨del incompleteness and
Church-Turing uncomputability, by formulating alternative proposals that only
computable structures, or finite computable structures, physically exist (2008,
p22).4
In light of such speculation, the following sections analyse the concept of
the multiverse in more detail: Section 2 examines the relationship between mul-
tiverses, theories, models and the ‘parameters of physics’; Section 3 considers
multiverses generated by different Lagrangians; and Section 4 assesses the im-
plications of Go¨del’s incompleteness theorem for theories of everything, and
considers whether the prospect of a parameter-free theory of everything would
really negate the possible existence of a multiverse.
2 Multiverses, parameters, theories and models
Multiverses are often introduced by varying the so-called ‘parameters of physics’.
These are typically parameters in the standard model of particle physics5, or
parameters which specify the initial conditions in general relativistic cosmology.
The values of these parameters cannot be theoretically derived, and need to be
determined by experiment and observation.
Philosopher of science Jesus Mosterin (2004) points out that “the set of all
possible worlds is not at all defined with independence from our conceptual
schemes and models. If we keep a certain model (with its underlying theories
and mathematics) fixed, the set of the combinations of admissible values for its
free parameters gives us the set of all possible worlds (relative to that model).
It changes every time we introduce a new cosmological model (and we are in-
4Tegmark defines a computable structure to be one whose relations can be obtained by
computations which are guaranteed to halt after a finite number of steps (2008, p20)
5Note that the standard ‘model’ is, in terms of mathematical logic, a theory and not a
model.
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troducing them all the time). Of course, one could propose considering the set
of all possible worlds relative to all possible models formulated in all possible
languages on the basis of all possible mathematics and all possible underlying
theories, but such consideration would produce more dizziness than enlighten-
ment.”
Mosterin’s point here is aimed at the anthropic principle, and the suggestion
that there are multiverses which realise all possible combinations of values for
the parameters of physics. At face value, this might seem to be a different
type of multiverse than that obtained by varying mathematical structures and
models, but in fact, the values chosen for the free parameters of a theory actually
correspond to a choice of model.
As an example, consider the free parameters of the standard model of particle
physics. These include: the coupling constants of the strong and electromagnetic
forces; two parameters which determine the Higgs field potential; the Weinberg
angle; the masses of the elementary quarks and leptons; and the values of four
parameters in the Kobayashi-Maskawa matrix which specifies the ‘mixing’ of the
{d, s, b} quark flavours in weak force interactions. In terms of a choice of model,
the value chosen for the coupling constant of a gauge field with gauge group G
corresponds to a choice of metric in the Lie algebra g, (Derdzinksi 1992, p114-
115); the Weinberg angle corresponds to a choice of metric in the Lie algebra
of the electroweak force, (ibid., p104-111); the values chosen for the masses of
the elementary quarks and leptons correspond to the choice of a finite family
of irreducible unitary representations of the local space-time symmetry group,
from a continuous infinity of alternatives on offer (McCabe 2007); and the choice
of a specific Kobayashi-Maskawa matrix corresponds to the selection of a specific
orthogonal decomposition σd′ ⊕ σs′ ⊕ σb′ of the fibre bundle which represents a
generalization of the {d, s, b} quark flavours, (Derdzinski 1992, p160).
Nevertheless, Lee Smolin (2009) argues against the notion that there exists
a multiverse of (timeless) universes. Smolin believes that the need to invoke
a multiverse is rooted in the dichotomy between laws and initial conditions in
existing theoretical physics, and suggests moving beyond this paradigm.
A choice of initial conditions, however, is merely one of the means by which
particular solutions to the laws of physics are identified. More generally, there
are boundary conditions, and free parameters in the equations, which have no
special relationship to the nature of time. To reiterate, each theory in mathe-
matical physics represents the physical world by a species of mathematical struc-
ture, for which there are, in general, many possible non-isomorphic models; the
laws associated with that theory select a particular sub-class of these models.
As Earman puts it, “a practitioner of mathematical physics is concerned with
a certain mathematical structure and an associated set M of models with this
structure. The. . . laws L of physics pick out a distinguished sub-class of models
ML := Mod(L) ⊂ M, the models satisfying the laws L (or in more colorful, if
misleading, language, the models that “obey” the laws L),” (p4, 2002).6 The
6If those laws contain a set of free parameters {pi : i = 1, ..., n}, then one has a different
class of models ML(pi) for each set of combined values of the parameters {pi}.
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application of a theory to explain or predict a particular empirical phenomenon,
then requires the selection of a particular solution, i.e., a particular model. The
choice of initial conditions and boundary conditions is simply a way of picking
out a particular model of a theory.
One point of nomenclature to note in passing here is that, whilst mathemat-
ical logicians consider a theory to be the set of sentences which define a species
of structure, physicists consider the laws which define a sub-class of mathemat-
ical models to define a theory. If one retains the same species of mathematical
structure, but one changes the laws imposed upon it, then, as far as physicists
are concerned, one obtains a different theory. Thus, for example, whilst general
relativity represents space-time as a 4-dimensional Lorentzian manifold, if one
changes the laws imposed by general relativity upon a Lorentzian manifold, (the
Einstein field equations), then one obtains a different physical theory.
Irrespective of the nomenclature, the crucial point is that any theory whose
domain extends to the entire universe, (i.e. any cosmological theory), potentially
has a multiverse associated with it: namely, the class of all models of that theory.
Irrespective of whether a future theory abolishes the dichotomy between laws
and initial conditions, as Smolin prescribes, the application of that theory will
require a means of identifying particular models of the species of mathematical
structure selected by the theory. If there is only one physical universe, as Smolin
claims, then the problem of contingency will remain: why does this particular
model exist and not any one of the other possibilities? The invocation of a
multiverse solves the problem of contingency by postulating that all the possible
models physically exist.
3 Lagrangians and multiverses
At a classical level in mathematical physics, the equations of a theory can be
economically specified by a Lagrangian, hence it is typical in physics to identify
a theory with its Lagrangian. This point is particularly crucial because it also
explains why different ‘Effective Field Theories’ (EFTs) are associated with
different ‘vacua’.
The Lagrangians of particle physics typically contain scalar fields, such as
the Higgs field in the unified electroweak theory, or the moduli fields of string
theory, (which purportedly control the way in which six of the ten space-time
dimensions are compactified). The scalar fields have certain values which con-
stitute minima of their respective potential energy functions, and such minima
are called vacuum states (or ground states). If one assumes that in the cur-
rent universe such scalar fields reside in a vacuum state, then this can yield
new Lagrangians in two different ways. Firstly, if a particular vacuum state
is chosen and substituted into the general Lagrangian, then this yields a re-
duced Lagrangian. Each different vacuum state can yield a different reduced
Lagrangian. Secondly, however, the choice of a vacuum state can yield a La-
grangian for the low-energy fluctuations above the vacuum state. This is called
the Lagrangian of an effective field theory. As Smolin puts it, “An effective
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field theory is a semiclassical field theory which is constructed to represent the
behavior of the excitations of a vacuum state of a more fundamental theory
below some specified energy scale. They have the great advantage that one can
study a theory expanded around a particular solution, treating that solution as
a fixed background,” (2005, p29). Different choices of vacuum state will yield
different effective theories of low-energy phenomenology.
Neither the reduced Lagrangian nor an effective Lagrangian are the La-
grangian of the fundamental theory. The selection of a vacuum state yields a
new Lagrangian, and because a Lagrangian defines a theory, the selection of a
vacuum state for a scalar field is seen to define the selection of a theory. It is
therefore typical in physics to speak, interchangeably, about the number of pos-
sible vacua, and the number of possible effective field theories in string theory.7
The collection of different string theory vacua defines the so-called string theory
‘landscape’, and this landscape defines a type of multiverse.
However, it should be carefully noted that the string theory landscape defines
a collection of different (effective) theories, not a collection of models of a fixed
theory. Hence, even if one fixes a particular fundamental string theory, and even
if one selects a particular vacuum state and a particular low-energy effective
theory, this point in the string theory landscape itself corresponds to another
multiverse, consisting of the class of all models of that effective theory.
4 Mathematical logic, theories of everything,
and multiverses
A final theory of everything, with no free parameters, has often been postulated
as a superior alternative to the multiverse generated by our current suite of
theories, with their various free parameters. The idea here is that the values of
the free parameters in current theories, will follow by definition from the axioms
of a final theory, in the same way that the value of pi follows from the axioms of
classical Euclidean geometry. However, whilst there may be no free parameters
in a final theory, the absence of free parameters is no guarantee that a theory
will possess only one model. Hence, even if a final, parameter-free, theory of
everything is obtainable, it may still generate a multiverse consisting of all its
mutually non-isomorphic models.
However, before we proceed to consider the conditions under which a theory
of everything will generate a multiverse, we first need to address the frequent
question of whether Go¨del’s incompleteness theorem is inconsistent with the
possibility of a theory of everything.
To reiterate, theories generally have many different models. For example,
each different vector space is a model for the theory of vector spaces, and each
7Note that not all EFTs are obtained from a fundamental theory by the selection of a
vacuum state. Whilst the latter can be considered a ‘top-down’ approach to obtaining EFTs,
there are also ‘bottom-up’ approaches, in which, for example, the parameters in an existing
Lagrangian are modified under Renormalization Group equations to obtain a new EFT. See
Hartmann (2001) for a comprehensive analysis of EFTs.
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different group is a model for the theory of groups. The class of groups and
the class of vector spaces can be said to be species of mathematical structure.
Conversely, given any structure or model U, there is a theory ThU which consists
of the sentences which are true in the structure U, (Enderton, p148).
Now, a theory T , in the sense defined in mathematical logic, is defined to
be complete if for any sentence σ, either σ or its negation ¬σ belongs to T
(Enderton p156). A theory T is defined to be decidable if there is an effective
procedure of deciding whether any given sentence σ belongs to T , where an
‘effective procedure’ is generally defined to be a finitely-specifiable sequence
of algorithmic steps, (ibid., p61-62). A theory is axiomatizable if there is a
decidable set of sentences in the theory, whose closure under logical implication
equals the entire theory (ibid., p156).
Go¨del’s incompleteness theorem revolves around the theory of Peano arith-
metic (the theory of conventional additional and multiplicational arithmetic),
and a particular model R = (N;0,S, <,+, ·,E) of Peano arithmetic, whose the-
ory ThR can be referred to as ‘number theory’ (Enderton, p182).8 It transpires
that the theory of Peano arithmetic is both incomplete and undecidable. More-
over, whilst Peano arithmetic is axiomatizable, Go¨del demonstrated that num-
ber theory ThR is undecidable and non-axiomatizable, (ibid., p202ff). Go¨del
obtained sentences σ, which are true in the model, but which cannot be proven
from the theory of the model. These sentences are of the self-referential form,
σ = ‘I am not provable from A’, where A is a subset of sentences in the theory,
(ibid., p184).
It should be recognized that an incomplete theory is a highly generic occur-
rence in mathematics, and is not in itself a pathology. The axiomatic theory
of groups, for example, is incomplete. Moreover, an incomplete theory can be
turned into a complete theory by adding more axioms. For example, whilst the
theory of fields is not complete, the theory of algebraically closed fields of char-
acteristic zero is complete (Enderton p156). The undecidability of a theory can
also be remedied in some cases by adding more axioms, but the crucial point
is that Go¨del discovered a type of undecidability which cannot be remedied by
the addition of extra axioms.
Whilst the application of mathematics to the physical world may be fairly
untroubled by the difficulties of self-referential sentences, undecidable sentences
which are free from self-reference have been found in various branches of math-
ematics. It has, for example, been established that there is no general means
of proving whether or not a pair of ‘triangulated’ 4-dimensional manifolds are
homeomorphic (topologically identical) (Geroch and Hartle, 1986).
Any theory which includes number theory will be undecidable, hence if a
final theory of everything includes number theory, then the final theory will
also be undecidable. Given that the use of number theory is fairly pervasive in
mathematical physics, this appears to be highly damaging to the prospects for
a final theory of everything.
8N is the set of natural numbers, 0 denotes the number zero as a distinguished element,
S is the successor function, S(n) = n + 1, < is the ordering relation on N, and +, ·,E are
addition, multiplication and exponentiation.
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However, it is still conceivable that a final theory of everything might not
include number theory, and in this case, a final theory of everything could still be
both complete and decidable. In addition, even if a final theory of everything
is incomplete and undecidable, it is the models U of a theory which purport
to represent physical reality, and whilst the theory of a model, ThU, may be
undecidable, it is guaranteed to be complete. That is, every sentence in the
language of the theory will either belong or not belong to ThU.
In conclusion, the potential undecidability of ThU, the theory of the struc-
ture of our universe, constitutes a potential epistemological limit for mathemat-
ical physics; it is potentially a limit on what can be proven about the structure
of our universe. However, the guaranteed completeness of ThU, entails that
there is no ontological barrier to the existence of a final theory of everything.
The concepts of mathematical logic, introduced to explain Go¨del’s theorem,
can also be exploited to shed further light on the existence of multiverses in
mathematical physics. In particular, it is fruitful to introduce the concept of
elementary equivalence.
Two models of a theory are defined to be elementarily equivalent if they
share the same truth-values for all the sentences of the language (Enderton p97).
Whilst isomorphic models must be elementarily equivalent, there is no need for
elementarily equivalent models to be isomorphic. For example, the structure
(R, <R) consisting of the real numbers, equipped with its conventional ordering
relationship, is elementarily equivalent to (Q, <Q), the set of rational numbers
equipped with its conventional ordering relationship. They both provide mod-
els of a complete theory,9 formulated in a first-order language containing the
symbols =,∀, <. However, whilst Q is a countable set, R is uncountable; there
cannot be an isomorphic mapping between sets of different cardinality, hence
these structures are non-isomorphic (Enderton p97-98).
Recall that any physical theory whose domain extends to the entire universe,
(i.e. any cosmological theory), potentially has a multiverse associated with it:
namely, the class of all models of that theory. Both complete and incomplete
theories are capable of generating such multiverses. Recalling that a complete
theory T is one in which any sentence σ, or its negation ¬σ, belongs to the
theory T , it follows that every model of a complete theory must be elementarily
equivalent. A theory will in general possess non-isomorphic models, but in the
case of a complete theory its class of non-isomorphic models will be elementarily
equivalent.
In contrast, if a theory is such that there are sentences which are true in
some models but not in others, then that theory must be incomplete, and in this
case, the models of the theory will be mutually non-isomorphic and elementarily
inequivalent.
Hence, mathematical logic suggests that the application of mathematical
physics to the universe as a whole can generate two different types of multiverse:
classes of non-isomorphic but elementarily equivalent models; and classes of
model which are both non-isomorphic and elementarily inequivalent.
9See Enderton p159, for the axioms of this theory.
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The further question then arises: are there any conditions under which a
theory has only one model, up to isomorphism? In other words, are there
conditions under which a theory doesn’t generate a multiverse, and the problem
of contingency (‘Why this universe and not some other?’) is eliminated?
The Lo¨wenheim-Skolem theorem, a significant result in mathematical logic
concerning the cardinalities of the models of theories, has a corollary which
provides an answer to this. This corollary holds that if a theory has a model
of any infinite cardinality, then it will have models of all infinite cardinalities
(Enderton p154). Models of different cardinality obviously cannot be isomor-
phic, hence any theory, complete or incomplete, which has at least one model
of infinite cardinality, will have a multiverse associated with. (In the case of a
complete theory, the models of different cardinality will be elementarily equiv-
alent, even if they are non-isomorphic). Needless to say, general relativity has
models which employ the cardinality of the continuum, hence general relativity,
for example, will possess models of every cardinality.
For a theory of mathematical physics to have only one possible model, it
must have only a finite model. A theory of everything must have a unique finite
model if the problem of contingency, and the potential existence of a multiverse
is to be eliminated.
References
[1] Derdzinski, A. (1992). Geometry of the Standard Model of Elementary
Particles, Texts and Monographs in Physics, Berlin-Heidelberg-New York:
Springer Verlag.
[2] Earman, J. (2002). Laws, Symmetry, and Symmetry Breaking; Invariance,
Conservation Principles, and Objectivity, Presidential address PSA 2002.
[3] Enderton, H.B. (2001). A Mathematical Introduction to Logic, Second Edi-
tion, London: Academic Press.
[4] Geroch, R., Hartle, J.B. (1986). Computability and Physical Theories,
Foundations of Physics, vol.16, No.6, pp533-550.
[5] Hartmann, S. (2001). Effective field theories, reductionism and scientific
explanation, Studies in the History and Philosophy of Modern Physics, 32,
pp267-304.
[6] Linde, A.D. (1983a). Chaotic inflating universe. Pis’ma v Zhurnal Eksper-
imental’ noi i Teoreticheskoi Fiziki 38, pp149-151. [English translation:
Journal of Experimental and Theoretical Physics Letters 38, pp176-179.]
[7] Linde, A.D. (1983b). Chaotic inflation. Physics Letters 129B, pp177-181.
[8] McCabe, G. (2007). The structure and interpretation of the standard model,
(Philosophy and Foundations of Physics Volume 2). Amsterdam: Elsevier.
9
[9] Mosterin, J. (2004). Anthropic explanations in cosmology, in Proceedings
of the 12th International Congress of Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of
Science, Hajek, Valds and Westerstahl (eds.). Amsterdam: North-Holland
Publishing.
[10] Smolin, L. (2005). The case for background independence, arXiv:hep-
th/0507235v1.
[11] Smolin, L. (2006). The status of cosmological natural selection, arXiv:hep-
th/0612185.
[12] Smolin, L. (2009). The unique universe, Physics World, June 2009, pp21-
25.
[13] Tegmark, M. (1998). Is ‘the theory of everything’ merely the ultimate en-
semble theory?, Annals of Physics, 270, pp1-51. arXiv:gr-qc/9704009.
[14] Tegmark, M. (2008) The Mathematical Universe, Foundations of Physics
38, pp101-50. arXiv:0704.0646v2
[15] Wallace, D. (2001). Worlds in the Everett Interpretation, Studies in the
History and Philosophy of Modern Physics, 33, pp637-661.
10
